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A system  for old-age  security  should  probably  combine  different
approaches:  mandated  savings  and  annuities;  a redistribution  of
income to old people  who did not earn  enough when they were
young  to build  an adequate  cushion  of savings;  fiscal  incentives
for nonmandatory  savings and annuities (including  tax incen-
tives for job-based  pension  plans);  and an informal  system of
purely voluntary  personal  savings  and family arrangements.
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A large and growing proportion of the world's  *  One mandates savings and annuities,  so that
population is old; the elderly are often poor; and  people are required  to set aside resources during
many countries face huge fiscal burdens because  their working years to take care of their needs
of promises they have made to give their older  when they are older. This pillar also ensures
citizens income security.  against such individual  risks as uncertain  longev-
These government old-age security policies  ity.
have been debated in developed countries for  *  One redistributes income to old people who
years; more recently they have also become a  did not earn enough when they were young to
matter of concern in developing countries. James  build an adequate cushion of savings.  This pillar
identifies the issues countries should consider as  may also ensure more broadly against such
they reevaluate their old policies and formulate  group risks as unexpectedly high inflation or
new ones.  unexpectedly low rates of return in the economy.
The structural differences among available  *  One provides fiscal incentives for
models for providing old-age security involve:  nonmandatory savings and annuities, such as tax
* The link between benefits and costs to each  incentives for job-based pension plans.
individual, which is closely tied to the plan's  *  One consists of purely voluntary personal
objectives (for example, savings and insurance  savings and family arrangements, a continuation
versus redistribution).  of the informal systcm of old-age security that
* Whether the scheme is funded largely in  remains important in most countries even after
advance or whether it is financed on a pay-as-  formal systems are in place.
you-go basis.  The mix of these pillars will vary frm  country
* How much the scheme relies on private or  to country, depending on their objectives and
public management.  economic conditions. James evaluates the impact
The choice between these models has broad  of different mixes on the distribution  of costs and
implications for the operation of labor and  benefits and discusses the difficulties  of making
capital markets, the fiscal system, and thus the  the transition from one system to another.
level, growth, and distribution of GNP.  She outlines a forthcoming study that will
James examines her working hiypothesis,  that  analyze important design features of each
a system built on several pillars is preferable to  system, such as conditions for eligibility and
any single method for providing old-age security  coverage, methods of financing, formulas for
- a mixed strategy is the best way to accom-  benefits and contributions, and provisions for
plish many goals with minimum costs, including  indexing and early retirement.  The study will
evasionary, distortionary, and uncertainty costs.  also propose reforms for existing public plans
Of four pillars,  that have become financially nonviable.
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Introduction  and  Summary
The  proportion  of the  world's  population  that  is  old is  large  and  growing,
this  group  is  often  poor,  and  many  countries  face  huge  fiscal  burdens  because  of
promises  they have made to provide income  security  to their older citizens.
Government  policies  regarding  old age  security  have  large  implications  for  the
labor  and  capital  markets,  the growth  potential  and fiscal  stability,  and  the
income  distribution  in a society.  While these  policies  have been debated  in
developed  countries  for  many years,  more  recently  they  have become  a matter  of
concern  in  developing  countries  as  well.  This  paper  is  designed  to lay  out  the
issues  that  countries  should  consider  as they  reevaluate  their  old  policies  and
formulate  new  policies  in this  area.  It also  lays  out  the issues  that  will be
considered  in a forthcoming  Bank study  of this  topic.
Although  most  developing  countries  have  long  had  some  formal  public  and/or
private  pension  programs,  their  coverage  has  often  been  limited  to formal  labor
markets  in  urban  areas. Old  age  security  for  the  rest  of  the  population  has  been
provided  through  extended  family  arrangements,  mutual  aid societies,  and  other
informal  mechanisms.  But  as  extended  family  ties  weaken  due  to  urbanization  and
mobility,  and as the proportion  of the population  that is old grows due to
medical  improvements  and  declining  fertility,  these  countries  will  be forced  to
reevaluate  their  degree  of reliance  on  informal  systems. This  is  now  happening
in  many  African  and  Asian  countries. The  challenge  facing  them  is how  to shift
to formal  systems  of income  maintenance  without accelerating  the decline in
1informal  systems,  and  how  to avoid  the  mistales  that  other  countries  have  made
as they  design  their  formal  systems.
The  need  to reevaluate  policy  is  even  more  pressing  for  countries  that,  in
the past,  introduced  formal  programs  of old age  security  whose costs  have  now
risen  to a point  that  they  can  no longer  afford,  as in  many Latin  American  and
Eastern  European  countries. For  example,  in  Argentina  the  population  over  age
60  is  28%  as  large  as  the  population  aged  20-60. Because  of  early  retirement  and
evasion,  the number  of beneficiaries  of their  public  pension  system  is 652 as
large  as the  number  of contributors.  This  means  that  every  contributing  worker
must support  two-thirds  of a retired  worker,  as well as himself. In Hungary,
where  fertility  and  retirement  age  have  declined  faster  but  evasion  is less  due
to  the  predominance  of  public  employment,  the  comparable  numbers  are  35%  and  512,
respectively;  each contributing  worker  must support  half of a retired  worker.
Not  surprisingly,  these  countries  have  been  unable  to pay  the  promised  benefits
and  have  reduced  the  real  value  by failing  to index  pensions  or by cutting  the
income  replacement  rate.  In Chile  the  basic  structure  of the system  has been
changed,  and  structural  changes  are  also  being  contemplated  in  many  high  and  low
income  countries.  The challenge  they face is how to redesign  their formal
systems  so that  they  will be sustainable  and  have  the  most favorable  effects  on
economic  growth  and  equity.
Several  alternative  models  for  providing  old  age  security  are  available  and
in place  in different  countries. These  vary in many ways but the  most basic
structural  differences  concern:  1) the  link  between  benefits  and costs  to each
individual,  which is closely  tied to the plan's  objectives  (e.g.  savings  and
2insurance  versus  redistribution),  2) whether the scheme  is largely  funded  in
advance  versus  financed  on a pay-as-you-go  basis,  3) the  degree  of reliance  on
public  versus private  management.  The choice among these models has broad
implications  for the operations  of the labor  and capital  markets,  the fiscal
system  and,  consequently,  for  the  level,  growth  and  distribution  of GNP. These
implications  ultimately  determine  the  preferred  system.
The working hypothesis,  which  will be examined  in the study,  is that a
multi-pillar  system  is preferable  to any single  method  for providing  old age
security.  One  pillar  mandates  savings  and  annuities,  so  that  people  are  required
to set aside  resources  during  their  working  years  to take  care of their  needs
when they are  older;  this  pillar  also insures  against  individual  risks  such  as
uncertain  longevity. Another  pillar  redistributes  income  to  old  people  who  did
not earn enough  when they  were young  to build  an adequate  cushion  of savings;
this  pillar  may  also  insure  more  broadly  against  group  risks  such  as  unexpectedly
high inflation  or unexpectedly  low rates  of return  in the economy.  A third
pillar  provides  fiscal  incentives  for  non-mandatory  savings  and  annuities,  such
as  tax  incentives  for  job-based  pension  plans. And a  fourth  pillar  consists  of
purely  voluntary  personal  savings  and  family  arrangements,  a  continuation  of  the
informal  system  of  old  age  security  and  that  still  play  an  important  role  in  most
countries  even  after  formal  systems  are  put  in  place. While  these  do  not  receive
tax  or  other  fiscal  incentives  they  are  strongly  influenced  by  broader  government
policies  such as policies  that permit  private  property,  encourage  growth  and
discourage  inflation.
Each pillar  is  most appropriate  for  a different  objective,  and  each  has a
3different  set  of  problems  attached,  some  of  which  are  not  measurable  in  advance.
Assumi-  that the incremental  benefits decrease  and the incremental  costs
increase  with program  size,  the  hypothesis  is that  a  mixed  strategy  is  the  best
way  to  accomplish  these  multiple  goals  with  minimum  costs,  including  evasionary,
distortionary  and  uncertainty  costs.
Most countries  with formal  systems  today  have the redistributive  pillar,
publicly  managed  on a largely  pay-as-you-go  basis.  In some  countries  this  has
been  supplemented  by  a  tax-advantaged  non-mandatory  savings-annuity  pillar.  Many
countries  do not  have a separate  mandatory  savings-annuity  pillar. If a  mixed
strategy  is adopted,  this might include  the creation  of a separate  mandatory
savings-annuity  pillar,  particularly  in  countries  where  political  and  demographic
pressures  have  led  to  unrealistic  promises  and  large  fiscal  burdens  that  make  the
current  pay-as-you-go  public  system  unsustainable  in  its  present  form. Creation
of such  a pillar  might  have the  additional  beneficial  effects  of reducing  the
distortionary  incentive  to evade  and facilitating  the  development  of long-term
capital  and  capital  markets,  hence  economic  growth.
The precise  mix of these  four  pillars  will vary from country  to country,
depending  on their  economic  circumstances,  their  objectives  and their initial
conditions. The study  will evaluate,  in some detail.  the impact  on benefits,
costs  and  their  distribution,  of  different  mixes  of  these  pillars,  as  well  as  the
difficulties  in transitioning  from  one system  to another.
In addition  to these  basic  structural  choices,  important  design  decisions
must be  made for  each  pillar. For  example:
4Who should  be covered?
What should  the contribution  rate  be,  in relation  to income?
What should  the  pension  target  be, in  .jlation  to income?
Should  pensions  be indexed  and, if so,  how?
Should  there  be a floor  and/or  ceiling  on contrib4tions  and  benefits?
What is the  normal  retirement  age;  what about  early  or late  retirement?
Should  there  be an earnings  test  or only  an age test  for  benefits?
Should  civil  servants  be given  special  pension  plans?
How  will  the  self-employed  be  treated;  wihat  about  small  business  employees?
How should  costs  be shared  between  workers  and  employers?
Shculd  redistributive  pensions  be means-tested  or universal  entitlements?
Should  they  be financed  out  of  payroll  taxes  or  general  treasury  revenues?
How  will non-working  spouses  be treated?
How will  widows  and  other  survivors  be  treated?
How will  evasion  be  minimized?
Should  pensions  be taxed;  should  pension  contributions  be tax-exempt?
What policies  should  guide  the  investment  of pension  reserves?
What  disclosure  and  other  regulations  should  apply  to  private  pension  plans?
Should  pension  consumers  have  choice  among  investment  and  benefit  policies?
Should  private  pensions  be insured  by the  government?
Should  record-keeping  be centralized,  even  under  decentralized  plans?
While this background  paper concentrates  on basic structural  issues,  a
forthcoming study will  include a  detailed discussion of  specific design
5features.'  A major  problem  with public  schemes  in  many countries  has  been the
provision  for  early  retirement,  which  has  increased  the  fiscal  burden  far  beyond
initial  expectations,  often  with undesirable  consequences  for  labor  supply  and
income  distribution. The  study will analyze  the  consequences  of these  design
features,  particularly  in  connection  with  the  public  redistributive  pillar  that
is currently  the mainstay  of most formal  systems,  and will suggest  possible
reforms,  to increase  the effectiveness  and decrease  the costs of the public
pillar.
Part I of this paper reviews the efficiency and equity reasons for
government  policies  concerning  old age security. Part II spells  out the  key
policy  choices  that  define  the  basic  nature  of  the  system;  this  is  the  foundation
for  the  multi-pillar  system. Part  III  discusses  the  major  cross-cutting  issues
that  arise  in connection  with each  pillar. Part IV summarizes  the  plan of the
study,  which  will include  detailed  analyses  of each  pillar,  extensive  empirical
evidence  and  policy  recommendations.
'  Survivor's  benefits  will be  covered  in  the  report  since  those  to  spouses
are an important  source  of income  security  for  old people  and they  are almost
always  included  in old  age income  security  programs. Problems  connected  with
high medical  expenses  in old age are  not covered  in this report. Obviously,
one's  income  needs  in old  age,  and  hence  the  pension  target,  depend  heavily  on
whether  medical  costs  are  covered  out  of personal  income  or in some other  way.
This  is  an  example  of  the  complex  interaction  between  old  age  income  security  and
other  safety  net  instruments.  In some  countries  pensions  and  medical  insurance
for  old  age  are  covered  in  the  same  sucial  security  program,  expenditures  for  the
latter exceed the former, and cross-subsidies  may be involved.  This study
assumes  that  medical  expenses  are  covered  by some  exogenous  public  or private
insurance  scheme  and deals  with the pension  implications  of other  consumption
expenses.  Disability  insurance  will  not  be  covered,  since  it  really  belongs  with
a discussion  of health  and unemployment  insurance. This again  pointe  up the
close connection  between these various forms of social insurance,  but  for
purposes  of this study  we will focus  on income  security  for  old age.
61. Efficiency  and  Equity  Reasons  for  Public  Policies  Concerning  Old  Age  Security
In  many  developing  countries  old  people  live  with  their  children  as  part  of
an  extended  family  and  their  consumption  needs  are  covered  by the  group. In  the
idealized  situation,  parents  invest  in their  children,  in return  their  children
support  them  later  on,  social  sanctions  in  close-knit  communities  reinforce  these
arrangements,  and  mutual  aid  societies  sometimes  extend  this  informal  insurance-
redistributional  system  beyond  the family  to the broader  ethnic  or cultural
group.
However,  even  when this system  works  well, some people  fall  between  the
cracks;  this includes  those  who never  had children,  those  whose children  have
died or moved away, and those  whose children  do not earn enough  to support
unproductive  household  members. More  recently,  these  cracks  have  widened  due  to
increased  urbanization  and mobility,  the growth  of the nuclear family,  wars,
famines,  medical progress  that has extended  life expectancy  for the old and
medical  problems  that  have  reduced  the  size  of  the  working-age  population  in  some
countries.
Both  market  failure  and  distributional  considerations  create  special  social
and governmental  concerns  about income security  for old age, when informal
systems  have broken  down.  This section  spells  out the efficiency  reasons  --
insufficient  savings,  incomplete  insur-nce  and lack  of consumer  information  --
as  well  as  the  equity  reasons  why  purely  voluntary  solutions  are  insufficient  and
public  policies  are  needed  in  this  area. Different  remedial  policies  are  implied
by different  rationales,  thus  motivating  the  multi-pillar  approach  recommended
7in this study.  Key questions  are: which types of plans are preferred on
efficiency  grounds  and  to  what extent  should  old  age security  programs  (versus
other  safety  net  instruments)  be  relied  upon  to  achieve  society's  distributional
goals
Insufficient  Saving
Age-earnings  profiles  tutn  down  sharply  after  a point 2 and  people  may  not
save "enough"  when they are young  to  maintain  an optimal  lifetime  consumption
stream  when they  are  old  and  less  productive. In the  simplest  case this  may  be
due to innocent  myopia --  informational  deficiencies,  that lead people to
underestimate  future consumption  needs, hence overestimate  the appropriate
discount  rate. Insufficient  saving  can  also  stem  from  moral  hazard  --  if  people
believe  that  those  who run  out  of  their  own  money  will eventually  be subsidized
by  someone  else,  such  as  the  state. Saving  is  then  not  privately  desirable,  even
if it is socially  desirable. It  may be socially  desirable  not  only  because  it
enables  people  to  maintain  their  standard  of  living  over  the  life  cycle,  but  also
because it provides  the capital  which  enables the economy to grow.  The
importance  of  capital  accumulation  both  as  a  motive  for  and  effect  of  government
policies  in this  area  will be one  of the  major themes  of this  study.
Insufficient  saving  creates difficulties  in old age, even if there is
perfect  certainty  about  the future  state  of the  world.  If this is the core
problem,  policies  that  encourage  savings  (e.g.  by  making  them  tax-deductible)  or
2  This may be due to "retirement"  in formal  labor  markets or decreased
productivity  for the elderly  in informal  markets.  Age-earnings  profiles  may
decline  more abruptly  in the former  than  the  latter.
8that  mandate  savings,  may  make everyone  better  off. Such  policies  redistribute
income  over the lifetime  of the individual  but do not redistribute  from one
individual  to  another. Government  control  over  these  savings  is  not  necessary,
however;  the savings can be placed into and invested  by public or private
institutions,  and  people  can  be given  choice  among  such institutions.
Risk-pooling  and  Insurance
The  old  age  security  problem  is  compounded  by risk  and  uncertainty  about  the
future. For  example,  people  are  uncertain  about  how  long  they  will  live,  and  may
wish  to  buy  annuity  insurance.  However,  if  private  insurance  is  poorly  developed
due  to  adverse  selection  and  weak  capital  markets,  annuities  may  not  be  available
(except  at terms  reflecting  the  worst risks  in society). 3 Therefore,  even if
people  save  enough  to last  an "expected  lifetime,"  some  of  them  will live  longer
than  expected  and  will run  out  of money.
If  insurance  companies  can  secure  information  about  the  risk  categories  into
which different  people should  be placed (e.g.  by medical examinations),  the
adverse  selection  problem  becomes  much smaller. However,  it  may not disappear
completely;  people  may continue  co know  more than the  company  about  their  own
3  Adverse  selection  may  occur  when  people  have  more  information  about  their
life expectancy  than  does the  insurance  company. Good and bad risks  are then
pooled  together  by  the  company  and  charged  premiums  according  to  the  average  risk
of the  group. However,  unless  the  good  risks  are  very  risk  averse  they  will  not
perceive these as acceptable terms and will not purchase annuities.  The
insurance  company  will be left with bad risks and  will raise its premiums,
leading  more  good  risks  to  opt  out. This  process  may  lead  ultimately  to  the  non-
availability  of insurance  for  most  people,  except  at terms  reflecting  the  wor:st
risks in society.  Government  policies  prohibiting  opting  out will stop this
process of progressive  opting  out and raising  premiums,  thereby  making  most
people  (except  the  very best  risks)  better  off.
9degree of riskiness.  Another solution  to this problem is to encourage  the
provision  of private  pension  plans  through  pre-formed  groups  such  as place  of
employment,  with constrained  opting  out; employers  may use them as part of a
strategy  for  attracting  and  retaining  workers. But  many employers,  especially
small  scale  employers  who  predominate  in  developing  countries,  may  not  choose  to
use this  strategy. Government  policies  that  require  the  purchase  of annuities
might  then make  everyone better off, by  eliminating  adverse selection,
strengthening  capital  markets  and  thereby  enabling  insurance  against  uncertain
longevity-related  income  needs,  to the degree  that this risk is uncorrelated
across  individuals.  Usually  combined  with  the  mandated  savings  plans  discussed
above, the mandated annuities could be  delivered by  public or  private
institutions.
Another,  more  problematic,  variant  of the  insurance  rationale  arises  when
outcomes  are  correlated  across  individuals,  e.g.  when the  future  inflation  rate
accelerates  much faster  than expected  or when future  rates  of return  for the
economy  as a  whole turn out  to be much lower  than expected. Inflation  can be
partially  insured  against  by investing  in equities  or indexed  securities,  but
private  arrangements  cannot  fully  insure  against  these  correlated  hazards,  which
are  particularly  critical  for  old people  living  on their  savings. Therefore,
government  intervention,  backed  by the power of taxation  and the ability  to
compel  payments  across  generations,  may  be a  necessary  part  of the  solution  for
these  market  failures. This  intervention  may  take  a  variety  of forms,  including
the  issuance  of indexed  treasury  bonds  to  be  purchased  by  private  pension  plans,
public guarantees  of private insurance,  or the provision  of public  pension
schemes.
10Incomp1ete  Consumer  Information
When provision  of goods  and services  are left to the  private  market  and
consumers  are given choice,  they require  information  to exercise  that choice
intelligently.  In the  case  of old  age  security  very long  term  arrangements  are
involved,  requiring  that  consumers  be informed  about  the  consequences  of their
actions  for  many years  into  the  future.
For  example,  to choose  an appropriate  savings-annuity  scheme  at age  35,  a
worker  would  have to evaluate  his  or her lifetime  consumption  needs (including
special  medical  needs),  the  likelihood  that  government  will  cover  these  needs  out
of  other  programs,  the  inflation  probabilities  facing  the  economy  as  a  whole,  and
the  expected  return  from  alternative  investment  plans,  including  the  likelihood
that  the  insurance  or investment  company  chosen  will still  be financially  viable
50 years later.  Private  companies  may not always provide that information
voluntarily.
To some  extent  governments  can  improve  the  flow  of information  by imposing
disclosure  requirements  on private  firms  that  handle  investments  and  pensions,
by regulating  them  in other  ways,  and  by education  campaigns  aimed  at informing
the  public  at large. Nevertheless,  if  one  believes  that  many  people  will still
be unable  to obtain  and digest  all the relevant  information  and if there  are
economies  of scale  in this  process,  we have another  rationale  for government
intervention  to mandate certain  actions  and limit consumer  choice regarding
11arrangements  for  old  age  security. 4
Should  Old  Age Security  be Used  to  Redistribute  Income?
Societies  may  wish to  use income  maintenance  in old  age  as a  mechanism  for
redistributing  income,  both  on equity  grounds  and for  efficiency  reasons,
if people care about each other's  well-being.  In many countries,  old age
security  systems are the major redistributive  mechanism.  A  central  policy
question is  whether  this  is  an  effective means  to  achieve society's
redistributional  objectives.
To analyze  this question  it is essential  to distinguish  between  lifetime
income  and current  income,  since  different  remedies  are implied  by these  two
measures. In the  absence  of  public  programs,  poverty  measures  based  on current
income  are  often  disproportionately  concentrated  among  old  people,  and  this  has
been  the  prime  justification  for  using  age  to  identify  the  poor  and  target  income
transfers.  However, old age is not necessarily  positively  correlated  with
poverty,  from a lifetime  income  point of view.  In fact,  since  higher  income
people  live longer,  on average,  the opposite  may be the case.  That is, as a
cohort ages a decreasing  proportion  of its living  members have experienced
lifetime  poverty,  since  its  poorer  members  tend  to die first. But  substantial
current  income  poverty  remains  among  the  old,  because  of  myopia  and incomplete
insurance  markets. To alleviate  this  problem,  inter-temporal  reallocations  of
a given person's  income  may be called  for, as in mandatory  savings-insurance
4  Incomplete  consumer  information  may be a particular  problem for low
income less educated consumers.  Thus mandatory government  schemes may be
particularly  aimed  at this  part  of the  market.
12schemes,  rather  than  redistributions  across  individuals.
Such  schemes  are  the  least  distortionary  way  to  eliminate  life  cycle  poverty
among the old.  However,  just as they decrease  poverty  in old age, they may
increase  poverty in youth, for some people. 5 They also do not eliminate
5  These  points  are  illustrated  in  Figure  1,  which  depicts  three  persons  --
A, B,  and  C  --  who  are  in  the  labor  force  when  they  are  aged  15-65,  withdraw  from
the labor force  at age 65, and die at age 85.  (For  purposes  of this simple
illustration,  certainty and exogeneity  are assumed  with respect to age of
retirement  and  death,  and  mandatory  savings-annuity  programs  are  assumed  to  leave
other  sources  of income  unchanged). The solid  lines  in Figure  I indicate  the
income  these  3 individuals  will have  for  each  period  of life,  in the  absence  of
government  programs.  A  "poverty  line",  PP. indicates  the minimum socially
acceptable  level  of income.
It can readily  be seen  that  person  A will operate  above  the poverty  line
throughout  his  or  her  life,  person  B  will  be above  the  poverty  line  while  working
but  below  it after  retirement  (due  to  myopia  or  moral  hazard),  and  person  C  will
be below  the  poverty  line  for  part of his  or her  working  life,  as  well as  when
old.  Thus,  according  to the  criterion  of current  income,  persons  B and C, or
two-thirds  of  the  population,  both  require  positive  redistribution  after  age  65.
However,  B's  lifetime  income  is  considerably  above  poverty  levels  and  may
even  be above  the  average  for  the  cohort  as a  whole.  If  we could  shift  some  of
her  income  from  youth  to  old  age,  through  mandatory  savings-annuity  programs,  her
poverty  would be eliminated,  leaving  us only  with person  C (one-third  of the
population)  with lifetime  income below the minimum necessary to eliminate
poverty.
This  possibility  is illustrated  by the  dotted  line  which  shows  the  smaller
income  after  mandatory  savings  that  each  person  is left  with  while  working,  and
the  larger  income  after  dissaving  that  he or  she  receives  after  age  65.  We see
there that person A,  as before, is always above poverty and person B's
"retirement  income"  is raised  beyond  poverty  levels  by this  process.
But  person  C's  old  age  income  remains  below  the  poverty  line  and,  moreover,
C is plunged  deeper  into  poverty  even  while  working,  by this  enforced  saving.
Thus  C  now  requires  access  to  other  safety  net  instruments  throughout  most  of  his
life, and for a larger total amount than before, an added burden  on other
government  programs. (This  raises  the  question  of  whether  in  mandatory  savings
programs,  a floor  should  be placed  on the income  level  which is subject  to the
savings  requirement,  to avoid  pushing  low  income  people  further  into  poverty).
Society  may  be  more  willing  to  redistribute  to  C  when  he is  over  age  65 and
no longer  subject  to  the  labor  disincentive  effect  of  need-based  transfers  that
apply  when he is  under  age  65.  This  redistribution  might  be financed  by a  PAYG
13lifetime  poverty  or transitory  poverty  based  on  unpredictable  events. A  variety
of  safety  net  instruments  are  available  to  remedy  these  remaining  problems,  some
old-age-related  and  some independent  of age.  Which  methods  are  more efficient
and  more equitable?
Old  age-related  instruments  have  the  advantage  that  the  labor  disincentive
effect  and its  opportunity  cost  are lower  for  the  elderly  poor,  who are  unable
to  work  and/or  whose  productivity  is  low;  hence,  optii  ,  transfers  within  cohorts
would seem to be higher  in old age.6  Also, in a context  of rapid  economic
growth, future cohorts will earn more than past cohorts, so equity (and
efficiency  under  interdependent  utilities)  may dictate  redistribution  from the
former  to the latter. This can  be accomplished  by age-based  transfers,  which
might be universal  or means-tested,  funded  on a pay-as-you-go  basis by the
working-age  generation.
On the  other  hand,  safety  net  instruments  that  are  not  age-related  have  the
advantage  of  broad  coverage,  benefiting  everyone  who  meets  the  income  criteria,
regardless  of age.  More specifically,  for  any given  stock  of redistributable
income,  one  must  look  at alternative  claimants,  and  it is  by no  means  clear  that
tax on the  more prosperous  workers in younger  cohorts,  whose lifetime  incomes
will be higher  due  to economic  growth.
6  But transfers  to the  elderly  poor  may  discourage  savings  when young  if
these are not mandatory;  in this sense,  making such Gavings compulsory  may
facilitate  transfers  to the elderly  poor.  Also, if an important  part of the
reason  for  working  when one is  young  is to accumulate  consumption  capacity  for
the time  when one is old,  anticipated  redistributions  to the elderly  poor may
diminish  this incentive  for  the  young to  work.  However,  the same  myopia  that
discourages  people  from  saving  may discourage  them  from  taking  full  account  of
(or  fully  anticipating)  the  need-based  income  that  may  be redistributed  to them
when they are  old, so this  disincentive  effect  on  work may  be small.
14the older generation  has the strongest  case.  Suppose  we think of the more
prosperous  members  of the  working  age  generation  (GEN2-Rich)  as the  source  of
these  redistributable  funds. Competing  claimants  for  receiving  these  funds  are
the  older  generation  (GEN3),  poorer  members  of  GEN2,  and  children  (GENI). Now,
families  with lower  lifetime  incomes  tend to have  more children  than families
with higher  lifetime  incomes,  and  children  from  poor  families  tend  to  have less
-- cess to good health  and educational  facilities,  hence to remain  poor.  In
addition,  young  families  are  at a  low  point  on their  age-earnings  profiles,  and
capital  market  failure  prevents  intertemporal  shifts,  even  if  the  families  want
them. Therefore,  targeting  redistributions  to  young  families  with  many  children
(to GEN2-POOR  and GENI, e.g. through  public spending  on primary education,
primary  health  care,  and food  programs)  may have a more equalizing  effect  on
current  income  across  the  population,  on lifetime  income  within  cohorts  and  on
the inter-generational  transmission  of poverty,  than does targeting  to people
when they  are  old.
In  sum,  it  would  seem  that: 1)  the  higher  the  economic  growth  rate  and  the
disparity  between  productivity  of  young  and  old,  the  stronger  are  the  efficiency
and equity claims of the older generation,  and 2) the greater the income
inequality,  the  fertility-low  income  and  life  expectancy-high  income  connections
within  the  working-age  generation,  the  stronger  are  the  claims  of the  children
and their  families. 7 An additional  consideration  is that,  once redistributive
7  For example, in Figure 2A line GEN3YG gives the  lifetime income
distribution  of all people  in GEN3  when they  were voune and  GEN30LD  gives  the
lifetime  income  distribution  of this  same  cohort  when they  are  old. The  latter
has shifted to the right  because  many poor members of GEN3 have died before
reaching  old age.  Line GEN2 gives the lifetime  income  distribution  of the
current  working  age  generation.
15old  age  programs  are  in force  they  are  built  into  peoples'  expectations  and  to
abruptly  cancel  these  promises  would  pose serious  transitional  problems,  both
trom  an economic  and  political  point  of view.  We conclude  that redistribution
remains  an important  rationale  for  old  age  security  programs,  but  this  rationale
should  be interpreted  as part  of a  system  for  alleviating  lifetime  poverty,  not
simply  current  poverty, and should  be balanced  against the claims of other
disadvantaged  groups.  At the same time, any shift toward  non-age related
redistributive  systems  should  include  special  "grandfathering"  provisions  for
older  cohorts.
II.  Key Policy  Choices  That  Define  Old  Age Security  Systems
This section  spells  out  in greater  detail  the  range  of options  available,
in  use,  or  under  consideration  for  solving  these  efficiency  and  equity  problems.
Three key  policy choices concern degree of  linkage between benefits and
It  can  readily  be  seen  that,  because  of  a  high  rate  of  economic  growth,  line
GEN2 lies far to the right of GEN3YG  or GEN30LD.  In fact, if we draw the
"poverty  line",  PP,  no members  of GEN2  have  an income  below  poverty  while  many
members  of  GEN3  are  below  poverty. This  is  a  case  where  redistribution  from  GEN2
to GEN30LD  would seem to be in order.  Optimal  redistributions  are especially
large  if the  labor  disincentive  effect  and  productivity  of GEN30LD  is low.
On the other  hand, in Figure  2B the growth  rate is much less while the
intra-cohort  income  disparity  and  the  disparity  in  life  expectancy  between  rich
and  poor are  much more.  In this  case  none  of the  surviving  members  of GEN30LD
have a lifetime  income  below  the  poverty  line,  while  many  members  of GEN2  have
incomes  below  poverty. Furthermore,  these  poor  members  of  GEN2  are  likely  to  be
the ones  with  many children  --  GENI.  This is a case  where redistributions  to
GEN2POOR,  especially  to  young  families  with  children,  would  seem  to  be in  order,
and  more  equitable  than  redistributions  to  GEN30LD. However,  GEN2POOR  and  their
children  may  not  have  the  political  power  to  bring  this  about,  precisely  because
of their  disadvantaged  position.
Figure  2A  may have applied  during  the  rapid  growth  period  of the  O.E.C.D.
countries  in  the 1950's  and  1960's  and  the  N.I.C.'s  in  the 1980's,  while  Figure
2B  may be more appropriate  in low-growth  countries  today.
16contributions,  use  of full funding  versus pay-as-you-go  (PAYG)  finance,  and
public  versus  private  locus  of  management. The  first  is closely  related  to the
objective of  the  plan,  in particular,  whether the policymakers wish  to
redistribute  income across individuals  and cohorts.  The  latter two have
important  implications  for  the  way  the  plan  is  implemented.  Each  of  these  policy
choices (and their combinations)  implies a  different type of  government
intervention,  therefore  each  has  different  "public"  elements,  even  if  the  private
sector  plays  a  major role.
Should  Benefits  Be Linked  to Contributions?
Figure 3 sets forth the different  combinations  of benefit-contribution
linkages,  degree  of funding,  and  managerial  locus  that  are  possible. Along  the
vertical  axis  alternative  policies  are  listed  according  to  the  proximity  between
incremental  benefits  and  contributions  made  by the  individual,  which  is  closely
related  to the  degree  of  voluntarism  involved.
The  most  voluntary  government  policy  (row  1) is  simply  to  encourage  (e.g.,
through  tax  incentives)  individual  savings  and  pension  plans.  Families  choosing
these plans have indicated  by their actions that they believe the expected
benefits  are at least  as great  as the  expected  costs,  ex ante. 8 When savings-
annuity  schemes  are  provided  through  place  of  employment,  such  plans  are  usually
voluntary  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  employer  but  may  only  be  quasi-voluntary  from
8  Of course,  when insurance  is provided  actual  benefits  and costs  will
diverge  for  different  individuals.  ex  post. In  this  paper  voluntary  actions  and
redistribution  are  defined  in  terms  of  expected  values  ex  ante,  not  actual  values
ex post.
17the  viewpoint  of the  worker,  if little  choice  is available  in  the  labor  market.
In such cases,  expected  benefits  and costs  may diverge  for some individuals,
although  not for  most.9 The  U.S. and U.K. are two countries  that have relied
heavily  on programs  of this sort.
Mandatory savings-annuity  or  "defined contribution"  schemes (row 2)
constitute  an  alternative  policy  which  implies  somewhat  less  voluntarism,  since
they set a  minimum floor  on peoples'  savings. howevt_r,  the  disparity  between
benefits and  costs  is  limited because the  expected monetary value  of
contributions  and receipts  are equal over the lifetime  of each individual.
Specified contributions  are paid in to each individual's  account and are
eventually  paid out to that person,  with investment  returns,  in the form of
annuities. Because  the  investment  returns  are  uncertain,  so  too  is  the  eventual
benefit. Singapore,  Malaysia  and  Chile  are  key  examples  of countries  with such
"provident  funds"  or "defined  contribution"  plans.
Next  in  order  are  the  mandatory  "defined  benefit"  plans  (row  3),  of  the  type
found  in  all  O.E.C.D.  countries  and  in the  civil  service  and  formal  labor  sector
in many developing  countries,  especially  Latin  America.  In these  plans, the
9  The fact that  most firms  choose  to offer  these  pension  plans suggests
that  they  are  used  as  part  of the  employers'  recruitment  and  retention  strategy
(paying  higher  compensation  to  long  term  workers  in  accordance  with  their  higher
productivity)  and/or  that  employers  believs  most  workers  prefer  them  to  pecuniary
wages.  In either  case,  pension  benefits  to  the  worker  are  at least  as  great  as
the  productivity-determined  wages  foregone. However,  if  job  choice  is  limited.
a minority  of  workers  may have  different  tastes  and  may not find  employers  who
offer  their  preferred  compensation  package.  Also,  some  workers  may  not  correctly
evaluate  the  expected  benefits  and  costs  ex ante  and  may  be  disappointed  as  they
gain  more information  later  on.  These  limited  choice  and  information  models  may
result  in  a  divergence  between  peoples'  probable  benefits  and  costs  in  employer-
sponsored  plans,  as discussed  further  in  Chapter  6.
18benefit  is prescribed  according  to some formula  which often  includes  years of
service  and  average  earnings  over the  last  few  years.  So long  as this  promise
is kept, the benefit  is known  with certainty;  however,  the  promise  may not  be
kept if the  rate of return  in the  economy  as a  whole  turns  out to  be different
from  that  expected. In such  plans  the  benefit  need  not  be closely  connected  to
contributions  even  over  a  person's  entire  lifetime,  some  people  may  be required
to contribute  much  more  than  they  ever  expect  to receive,  and  vice-versa.  Thus,
such  plans  can  be  redistributive  and  indeed,  as discussed  below,  redistribution
is often  a  major  goal. However,  if the  formulae  are  not  carefully  constructed,
some  of the  redistributions  that  occur  may  be  inadvertent  and  violate  principles
of horizontal  or  vertical  equity.
Underlying all of these are the purely voluntary savings and family
arrangements  that are not mandated  or tax-induced  by the government  and are,
instead,  a continuation  of the informal  system  of old  age security  (row  4).
Two important  observations  fall out of this classification  of schemes
according  to  the  linkage  between  benefits  and  costs  for  each  individual.  First,
different  degrees  of  voluntarism  are  used  to  meet  different  objectives.  That  is,
if  the  goal  is  to  get  people  to save  more  and  to  insure  against  the  income  needs
of  longevity, (i.e. to  solve the  insufficient  savings, risk-pooling and
incomplete consumer information  problems outlined above) governments can
encourage  or  mandate  savings  and  annuity  plans. These  shift  current  income  over
the  lifetime  of  the  individual  and  across  individuals  with different  life  spans
ex  post,  but  they  do  not  redistribute  expected  lifetime  income  across  individuals
or generations. (They  also  need  not  be publicly  managed,  as  will  be discussed
19under  the  second  key  policy  choice,  "locus  of management,"  below).
However,  if the goal is to change  the distribution  of expected  lifetime
income  across individuals  or generations,  a greater degree  of compulsion  is
involved,  since  there  is,  by  definition,  a  greater  disparity  between  benefits  and
costs  for  some  individuals.  Most  people  who  recognize  they  are  "losers"  will opt
out if they can; this implies  that redistributive  plans cannot  be voluntary,
cannot  give  people  much choice,  and  are  likely  to be set  up as defined  benefit
rather  than  defined  contribution  plans. Thus,  the  objective  of  the  plan  strongly
influences its  structure, particularly the  linkage between benefits and
contributions  and the  appropriate  degree  of voluntarism.
A second  observation  is that  this  classification  leads  directly  to a  whole
set of questions  regarding  the impact  on labor  supply  and demand  and capital
accumulation,  stemming  from  the  disparity  between  expected  benefits  and  costs.
Voluntary  savings-annuity  plans (as  in rows l  and 4) should  not introduce  such
distortions  in behavior. Once  contributions  to retirement  funds  are  mandatory
(as  in  row  2),  the  automatic  link  between  the  individual's  subjective  valuation
of costs  and  benefits  is broken;  people  who are forced  to save  more than they
desire  will value the  benefits  less than the  costs.  However,  the gap  between
costs  and  benefits  is  much greater  in redistributive  schemes  (row  3).
Therefore  a mandatory  redistributive  scheme  can  be analyzed  and  evaluated
very much like a tax-subsidy  scheme.  It may discourage  labor  employment  if
contributions  are  tied  to  earnings,  savings  if  they  are  tied  to  investment  income
and, perhaps  more importantly,  it poses serious problems  of evasion -- e.g.
20through  under-reporting  income  and shifting  to  the  underground  or the informal
economy.  While  the  ir-gnitude  of  these  effects  is  uncertain,  has  been  the  subject
of much debate,  and  undoubtedly  varies  from  country  to country,  it is probable
that  redistributive  plans  are  more  distortionary  than  mandatory  savings-annuity
plans, because, by  definition, they drive  a  greater wedge  between the
individual's  benefits  and costs.  This suggests  an efficiency  advantage  of
relying on the latter to the extent possible, i.e. except in cases where
correlated  risk  or long term  poverty  are involved.
Should  the  Plan  be Largely-Funded  or Pay-As-You-Go?
A second  important  distinction  involves  the  choice  between  largely-funded
versus  pay-as-you-go  (PAYG)  financing. Under  PAYG, the  current  revenues  of a
plan cover  its  current  obligations;  there  is no stock  of savings  for  old age.
Under a largely  funded  plan, capital  accumulates  to pay a stream  of future
obligations. 10 One  important  question  is  whether  the  implicit  contract  inherent
10  Under  a fully  funded  plan,  at any  point  in time  aggregate  contributions
collected,  together  with  the  returns  earned,  will  be  enough  to  cover  the  present
value  of  the  future  obligations.  Full  funding  may  be  defined  in  terms  of  accrued
or  projected contributions  and  liabilities.  Mandatory savings "defined
contribution"  schemes  are,  by  definition,  fully  funded,  since  each  individual  is
only  entitled  to  the  proceed  of  his  account,  at  any  given  time. However,  in  case
of a "defined  benefit"  plan  this  concept  is  ambiguous. For  example,  the  degree
of funding  is dependent  on the future  rate of return,  which is assumed  to be
known.  If the  actual  rate  of return  turns  out  to be lower,  a defined  benefit
plan  which appears  to be fully  funded  may  not be,  in fact,  and  vice  versa.
Furthermore,  if  people  live  longer  than  expected  or  retire  earlier,  a  system
that appears  to be fully  funded  will not be, and a change  in the benefit  or
cont.-ibution  rate  will  be  required  to  bring  it  back  into  balance. This  may  imply
inte:-generational  transfers  unless  age-specific  rates  are  established.
Also, if  benefits  are  tied  to  earnings,  the  contribution  rate  required  for
full  funding  depends  on the  person's  age-earnings  profile. If the  age-earnings
profile  changes  for  different  cohorts,  this  requires  corresponding  changes  in  the
21in a PAYG scheme  or the explicit  promise  in a largely  funded  scheme  is more
likely  to be honored.
The  degree  of funding  is  closely  tied  to the  benefit-contribution  linkage,
as shown  in  Figure  3.  "Defined  contribution"  schemes  are,  by definition,  fully
funded. "Defined  benefit"  plans  can,  in  theory,  be  fully  funded,  but  in  the  real
world  they  almost  invariably  tend  to be only  partially  funded  or PAYG.
PAYG or partially  funded  plans  have  important  advantages,  including  their
ability to pay benefits  to old people immediatcly,  when the plan is first
introduced,  and  to  facilitate  equitable  inter-generational  transfers  in  a  context
of rapid  economic  growth. These  advantages  made  them  the  preferred  system,  for
example,  in the  O.E.C.D.  countries  over  the  last  half  century. These  transfers
were accomplished  through defined benefit schemes,  which helps explain  why
defined  benefit schemes  have been largely  PAYG --  both of these structural
characteristics  have  helped  achieve  their  redistributive  goals.
However,  their  disadvantages  are  that  they  may  diminish  capital  accumulation
relative  to  largely  funded  plans,  lead  to  unanticipated  fiscal  burdens  and  imply
undesirable  inter-generational  transfers,  particularly  when  economic  growth  slows
contribution  (or  benefit)  rate.  But, since  the age-earnings  profile  is not
known  in  advance,  a  fund  may  again  appear  to  be fully  funded  while  in  fact  it  is
not. As above,  since  cohorts  overlap,  this  implies  inter-generational  transfers
unless  different  contribution  rates  are  set  for  people  of different  ages  who are
working  at the  same  time  --  certainly  a complex  situation.
For  all  these  reasons,  the  concept  of a "fully  funded  plan"  is rarely  used
in  this  paper. Instead,  this  paper  uses  the  concept  of  a "largely  funded  plan",
which  raises  all  the  key  questions  of investment  policy  and  capital  allocation.
22down.  A large controversy  has developed  about the question  of whether PAYG
schemes  decrease  savings  and  the answer  has not  yet been resolved,  as will be
discussed  in  Part  III  of this  paper. But  even  if  PAYG  does  not  decrease  savings
relative  to  a non-mandatory  situation,  it  seems  possible  to construct  mandatory
funded  plans that will increase  savings,  hence economic  growth, and may be
preferred  on those  grounds.
In  addition,  the  promises  enabled  by PAYG  financing  have often  been  overly
generous  from the long run point  of view.  Workers  today  pay pensions  to the
small  group  of retirees  today,  and in return  expect  future  workers  to pay for
their  pensions,  when  they  retire. This  implicitly  places  an  obligation  on  future
generations,  who  are  not  around  to  participate  in  the  decision. This  has  set  the
stage  for  conflict  later  on,  when the fiscal  burden  is  much greater  and future
generations  are  not  willing  or able  to keep  these  promises.
These  problems  arise,  in particular,  in the context  of large  demographic
changes  that  alter  the  ratio  of  working  age  to older  population  groups. As the
ratio  of retirees  to  workers  grows,  due  to increasing  longevity  and  decreasing
fertility,  each  worker  must  contribute  a  larger  share  of  his  earnings  to  support
retirees,  under  a  PAYG  system. This  is  economically  and  politically  viable  only
if productivity  and  wages are growing  even more rapidly.  But, productivity
cannot  always  be counted  on to grow rapidly,  workers  may doubt the continued
viability  of  the  system,  and  the  implicit  promise  to  retirees  may  not  be  honored.
Latin  America,  Eastern  Europe  and  some  O.E.C.D.  countries  are  now  experiencing
these  recontracting  problems. Of  course,  a largely  funded  plan  also  experiences
problems  as  the  population  ages,  dissaving  by  retirees  exceeds  saving  by  workers,
23and  the old consume  a larger  share  of GNP.  A crucial  question,  therefore,  is
whether  GNP  and  productivity  are likely  to  be higher  under  one  system  than  the
other.  One  object  of the  forthcoming  study  is to help  countries  think  through
the  long  term  consequences  of  their  policy  cholices,  anticipate  and  thereby  avoid
the  "unanticipated"  effects,  and  consider  alternative  ways  of  responding  in  those
countries  where they  have already  occurred.
Should  Management  be Public  or Private?
The horizontal  axis in Figure 3 distinguishes  between old age security
arrangements  that are  publicly  managed  and  monopolistic,  versus  those  that  are
privately  managed  with competition  and  choice." The  concept  of  management  has
several  different  dimensions;  for example,  record-keeping,  administering  pay-
outs,  and  investing  pension  reserves  are  all  examples  of  management  activities
that  might  be handled  privately.  At this  point,  management  is  defined  to cover
the  determination  of  benefits  forthcoming  from  any  given  amount  of  contributions
and  the  methods  of investing  accumulated  funds.
The  objective  of  the  plan  strongly  influences  the  locus  of  management,  just
as  it  influenced  the  benefit-contribution  linkage  and  the  degree  of  funding.  For
example,  competitive  privately  managed plans (based  on cos.sumer  choice) are
11 Private  monopolistic  management  is  also  possible. However,  this is  not
found  in any real world system  nor does it seem desirable  since  much of the
advantage  of  private  management  stems  from  competition.  In  this  report,  private
management  also implies  choice  and competition,  unless  otherwise  stated.  A
private  employer  who manages  the  pension  plan  of his own  firm  may appear  to be
doing  this  on  a  non-competitive  basis. However,  that  employer  has  the  option  of
turning  the pension  plan over to an investment  or insurance  company;  in this
sense  implicit  competition  and  choice  are  present.
24unable  to redistribute  net  benefits,  since  they  will tend  to lose  the  customers
who  are  being  "redistributed  away  from." In  contrast,  public  monopolies  have  the
power to cross-subsidize  and also make the "defined  benefit"  contract  more
credible,  since  government  has the  power  to tax in order  to keep its  promise.
Thus, if redistribution  is an important  goal,  public  control  seems  necessary.
And, even if redistribution  was  not the  goal  ex ante,  influential  groups  often
secure  redistributions  ex post through  publicly  managed  plans.
The locus  of  management  is  also  closely  related  to the  choice  between  full
funding  and  PAYG  finance. In  general,  competitive  privately  managed  plans  that
are responsible  for covering  benefits  out of contributions  plus investment
earninLa  must be fully  funded  to  assure  the  ability  to  meet future  commitments.
Therefore, if full funding is considered  socially desirable,  this can be
accommodated  by relying  on competitive  privately  managed  plans.  In contrast,
given  the  government's  power  to compel  contributions  through  taxation,  publicly
managed  monopolies  can  finance  their  current  benefit  obligations  out  of  current
premiums.' 2 As a result,  all  PAYG  plans  are  publicly  managed  and  most publicly
managed  plans  are PAYG  or only lightly  funded.
The  public-private  dichotomy  has  important  implications  for  the  allocation
of  capital,  hence  the  rate  of  economic  growth,  since  public  and  private  managers
12  Employer-sponsored  defined  benefit  plans can also be only partially
funded,  backed  up by the  employer's  promise  to pay.  While  many  plans  were run
on  this  basis  in  the  past,  this  poses  obvious  problems,  including  the  questions
of what the impact  will be on the firm's  competitive  position  when it has to
cover  the  pension  costs  of  many  retired  workers,  how  payment  will  be  made if  the
employer's  business  declines  or  goes  bankrupt,  and  whether  the  government  should
provide  pension  insurance  in  such  an  eventuality,  in  which  case  certain  minimum
fiduciary  requirements  may also  be set.
25may  have  quite  different  investment  objectives  and  constraints,  and  the  presence
or  absence  of  competition  further  influences  behavior. For  example,  competitive
private  managers  chosen  by consumers  who  will receive  the  investment  income  may
have an incentive  to maximize  the rate of return,  while monopolistic  public
managers  may  place  a  greater  value  on  minimizing  risk. As still  another  possible
arrangement,  the private managers  may be chosen by the government  under a
contracting  arrangement,  with  no consumer  choice  and  with all  returns  eventually
going into a single  public  fund;  then the incentive  structure  depends  on the
nature  of  the  bidding  process  and  the  terms  of the  contract,  and  is likely  to  be
some  hybrid  of these  two.
Controversial  regulatory  issues  raised  by the  locus  of  control  include  the
wisdom of: limiting  investments  to government  securities  (as  usually  done by
public  managers),  setting  optimal  ceilings  on risky investments  or floors  on
diversification (especially for  private  managers),  prohibiting foreign
investments,  allowing  multinationals  (or  joint  ventures)  to run  pension  funds,
requiring  the  dissemination  of information  about  portfolio  yield  and risk,  and
implicit  or explicit  insurance  by government  as a last resort.
Common  Policy  Combinations
In sum, a wide variety of options,  with different  benefit-contribution
linkages, redistributive  versus non-redistributive  objectives,  full funding
versus  PAYG  financing,  and  public  versus  private  management  are  available,  among
which countries can choose.  However,  some combinations  do not seem to be
probable on  a  priori grounds or to have  important empirical real world
26counterparts.  For  example,  the  voluntary-public  management  combination  does  not
seem to exist,  perhaps because  people  would not voluntarily  contribute  to a
publicly  managed  monopoly.  The  redistributive-privately  managed  and
redistributive-fully  funded  combinations  also  do not occur,  for  reasons  given
above.
Therefore,  a smaller  number  of models  predominate  empirically  in formal
systems  of old  age security,  and  seem  to capture  most of the important  issues:
(1)  voluntary  or  quasi-voluntary  savings-annuity  plans,  often  connected  to  place
of employment,  that  are encouraged  by government  policy  but  privately  managed;
(2)  mandatory  "defined  contribution"  savings-annuity  plans  that  are  fully  funded,
whose  investment  policies are  (a) publicly or  (b) privately managed; (3)
mandatory  "defined  benefit"  plans  with redistributive  goals,  that  are  publicly
managed  and  PAYG or partially  funded' 3; and (4)  purely  voluntary  savings  (full
funding)  and  transfers  (PAYG)  that  are  a remnant  of the informal  system  of old
age security. These  will be discussed  in detail  in the forthcoming  study.
In each  case,  attention  will be paid to a  number  of cross-cutting  themes:
the  insurance,  capital  and labor  market  effects  which influence  efficiency  and
growth, the redistributional  consequences,  the informational  and regulatory
issues  and  the  implications  for  fiscal  stability  of  each  model. These  themes  are
important  because  they  spell  out  the  probable  consequences  of  alternative  models
for  the level,  growth  and  distribution  of GNP.  The next  section  of this  paper
reviews,  more specifically,  the  major  questions  that  arise  with respect  to  each
13  The small  reserve  fund  found  in  some  redistributive  plans  is  usually  run
directly  by the  government. In rare  cases  it has  been turned  over to a quasi-
autonomous  body.
27of these cross-cutting  themes.  Particular  attention  should  be paid to the
special  conditions  in  developing  countries,  such  as their  starting  point  with a
very  young  age  profile  that  makes  it  politically  difficult  to  plan  for  the  aging
population  they  will have  later  on,  the  large  informal  labor  sector  and limited
administrative-enforcement  capacities  that make evasion  a major problem,  the
scarcity  of capital  and incomplete  capital  markets  that currently  exist,  the
heavy  reliance  on extended  family  arrangements  that snould  not  be crowded  out,
and the widely disparate  income  distribution  that leads to widely disparate
pension  demands. The  final  section  (Part  IV)  briefly  summarizes  each  chapter  in
the forthcoming  report,  and  makes  tentative  recommendations  for  a  multi-pillar
system  that  includes  a mix of all  four  models.
III.  Cross-Cutting  Themes
Insurance  Effects
What risks  regarding  old  age  do people  wish to insure  against  and  what are
the  best  mechanisms  for  doing  so?  For example,  one  may  wish to insure  against
the risk  that  the individual  will live longer  than  average,  hence  need greater
future  income  than  expected,  that  average  lifetimes  may increase,  that  inflation
may  accelerate,  or that  rates  of  return  in  the  economy  at large  may  be  lower  than
expected.
As discussed  above,  privately  managed  savings  and  pension  plans  can  insure
against the first of these risks, although  this is always limited by  the
possibility  of firm  bankruptcy.  Reinsurance  or government  guarantees  can  solve
28the  bankruptcy  problem,  but  at  the  expense  of  introducing  a  moral  hazard  problem
into  private  behavior  (e.g.  private  firms  may accept  high risks  in the  hope  of
getting  high  returns,  and  consumers  may  not  have  any  incentive  to  constrain  them,
if  pensions  are  insured;  witness  the  closely  related  S  &  L  disaster  in  the  U.S.).
The forthcoming  report  will consider  the  empirical  evidence  on these  issues.
As for  the  risks  of unexpected  accelerating  inflation,  increasing  average
life expectancy  and decreasing  rates of return,  which are correlated  across
individuals  in a  cohort,  private  plans  are  limited  in  their  ability  to credibly
insure. Some  private  financial  instruments  provide  partial  indexing,  but  these
cannot  be  counted  on  in  times  of rapidly  accelerating  inflation,  as  has  occurred
in  many developing  countries. A society  that  wishes  to enable  people  to insure
against  these  risks  may  therefore  decide  to  use  some  public  instruments,  such  as
the  purchase  of  indexed  government  bonds  by  private  plans,  government  guarantees
of private insurance,  or a publicly  managed plan, with a "defined  benefit"
formula  which  includes  indexing;  these  arrangements  are  all  backed  by the  power
of  taxation to  compel  redistribution across generations to  meet  these
obligations,  if  necessary.
However,  a  word  of  caution  is  in  order  here,  because  public  insurance,  too,
is  not  completely  credible. Governments  should  carefully  calculate  the  tax  and
defined  benefit  combinations  that  are  feasible  under  different  assumptions  about
demographic  change,  rates of return,  and inflation.  Otherwise,  they may be
making  an implicit  promise  of  insurance  that  will  not  be  honored  ex  post,  or  will
be honored only at greater cost to future generations  and with different
distributional  consequences  than  would have been  acceptable  ex ante.  This is
29discussed  further  in the section  on Government  Budgetary  Behavior,  below,  and
simulations  of  mutually  consistent  tax  and  benefit  combinations  will  be included
in the  report.
Capital  Market  Effects
What impact  do alternative  policies  have on peoples'  propensity  to save,
hence on the  ability of  the economy to  accumulate  capital?  This is a
particularly  important  issue for developing  countries,  for whom scarcity  of
capital  is  a  major  problem. If  different  old  age  security  schemes  have  different
effects  on the growth  of productivity  and GNP, this is probably  due to their
differential  effects  on savings  and  capital  accumulation.
Since  a stated  important  rationale  for  government  policies  toward  old  age
security  is the need to increase  savings,  it is ironical  that some policies
adopted  may actually  have had the opposite  effect.  One hypothesis  is that
personal  s-avings  for  old  a-e  will  decline  (relative  to  the  situation  without  anv
formal  policy)  if people  expect  their  retirement  income  needs  to  be met by the
government  under  a  PAYG  system. If  the  government  does  not save  more (  e.g.  by
running  a smaller  budgetary  deficit  or a larger surplus  than it would have
otherwise),  total national savings will  also decline, with  corresponding
consequences  for  capital  accumulation  and  economic  growth. Thus,  both  household
and government  behavior  determine  the final  outcome.  A large  literature  has
accumulated  on this question,  using data from the American social security
program. However,  interpretations  vary as to  whether  the  empirical  evidence  is
30consistent  with this  hypothesis."4
While the empirical  effects  of a pay-as-you-go  plan are thus unclear,  it
does  appear  that  largely  funded  schemes,  whether  publicly  or privately  managed,
have  the  potential  to  increase  capital  accumulation.  To realize  this  potential
they  must mandate saving  beyond  the  point individuals  would voluntarily  have
chosen, consumers  must not  find ways to evade these constraints  (e.g. by
borrowing  against  this saving,  by dissaving  other  assets  or by underreporting
their  income),  and  government  must not offset  this saving  by running  a  larger
budget deficit.  Again, both household  and government  behavior  interact  to
determine  the final  outcome. One (untested)  hypothesis  is that  funded  schemes
may make it easier  for governments  to dissave  by incurring  deficits,  thereby
offsetting  any increase  in personal  saving.  The more fixed is government
behavior,  the  higher  the  mandated  savings  rate,  and the  more limited  consumer
ability  to evade,  the greater  the likelihood  of a positive  effect  on saving.
This  capital-market-development  potential  is one  reason  why many countries  are
becoming  increasingly  interested  in  old age  security  arrangements  schemes  such
as the  Chilean  one,  which  mandates  savings.
If people  are myopic, or if there are externalities  from some uses of
capital  (such  as  research  and  development),  the  economy  as  a  whole  benefits  from
14  A counterargument  on theoretical  grounds  is that  personal  savings  may
remain  unchanged  or  even  increase  if  people  1)  would  not  have  saved  for  their  old
age  anyway  or do not  correctly  anticipate  the  future  payments  they  will receive
from  the  government  (a  form  of  myopia);  2) realize  that  their  children  will have
to pay more taxes to cover  the PAYG obligations,  and therefore  save to leave
larger  bequests  for  their  children  (perfect  foresight);  or 3) decide  to retire
earlier,  because  of their  increased  social  security  wealth.  A combination  of
these  three  reasons  may explain  why there  is no conclusive  evidence  that  PAYG
social  security  reduces  personal  savings.
31increased  saving. On the  other  hand,  if people  are  not  myopic  and  there  are  no
externalities  involved,  increasing  saving  beyond  the  point  that  individuals  would
voluntarily  have chosen  is not  welfare-enhancing. Indeed,  in a Keynsian-type
economy, increased saving may  depress aggregate demand and precipitate  a
recession. A common  presumption  is  that  the  first  scenario  holds  and  increased
capital accumulation  would be desirable in most developed and developing
countries,  at the present time.  However,  one should  bear in mind that, if
largely  funded  pension  schemes  become  more  widespread,  the  marginal  benefits  of
further  capital  accumulation  would  decline  and  this  presumption  might  no longer
hold.
One should  also bear in mind the caveat  that, if largely  funded  schemes
increase saving by the working population,  this effect is reversed as the
population  ages,  so  that  old  dissavers  exceed  young  savers.  With  funded  schemes,
demographic  change  may lead  to  swings  in  the level,  value  and  rate  of return  to
capital,  hence instability  in the capital  markets.  Under PAYG schemes  these
swings  in saving  and  dissaving  are  less  automatic  although  they  may occur  as  an
indirect  capital  market  respornse  to the  changirg  labor  supply.
Apart  from  their  impact  on  aggregate  saving,  largely  funded  plans  have  the
effect  of  channelling  this  saving  into  capital  market  institutions  for  a  long  and
well defined  time  period  (in  contrast  to savings  that  may  be  held  in  the  form  of
land,  jewelry,  or demand  deposits);  financial  intermediation  with a long time
horizon  may thereby  be facilitated. This  leads  to the empirical  and  normative
questions:  as  these  funds  accumulate,  how  will  they  be  invested,  how  should  they
be invested,  and  what role do (should)  regulations  play in this regard? Will
32(and  should)  fund  managers  be  conservative  or  risk-taking,  will  they  seek  short-
term  or  long-term  returns,  will  they  provide  venture  capital  in  their  investment
policies,  will they invest  in foreign  securities  or should  they  be encouraged
(required) to keep their funds at home?  Will  fund managers, as  large
shareholders,  try  to exercise  control  over the  companies  in  which they invest,
potentially  serving  as monitors  for  smaller  shareholders  who cannot  play this
role?  These  are crucial  questions  because,  in countries  where funded  schemes
predominate,  they become a major source  of long-term  capital;  a substantial
concentration  of capital market power may  develop.  This has occurred in
developed  countries  (e.g.  pension  funds  in  the  U.S.)  and  is  even  more likely  to
be the  case  in  developing  countries  (e.g.  provident  funds  in  Singapore,  Malaysia
and  Chile).
Since public  managers  chosen  by political  leaders  and private  managers
chosen  by individual  savers  may face  different  incentives  and  constraints,  they
may  exercise  this  market  power  quite  differently,  so  the  choice  of  public  versus
private  fund  management  may  strongly  influence  the  allocation  of capital  in the
economy. For  example.  private  managers  in the  U.S.,  U.K.,  and  Chile  have  quite
different  investment  patterns  from  public  or  quasi-public  managers  in  Singapore,
Malaysia  and  Sweden.
Still  a third (hybrid)  arrangement  would have the government  receive  all
contributions  and  issue  all  benefits  but  contract  out  the  management  of  the  funds
to an  autonomous  agency or to a  group of private managers, chosen in a
competitive  bidding  process. The advantage  here  would  come from  economies  of
scale  in administration  and  information-gathering  about  the  investing  skills  of
33private  managers.  Also,  under  this  arrangement  the  government  could  more  readily
add  on insurance  against  correlated  risks. The disadvantage  is the  possibility
that  political  factozs  and  croneyism  would  strongly  influence  the  award  of  these
potentially  lucrative  contracts. This study  will bring  to bear the available
analytic  and empirical  evidence  on this  question.
Should regulations  require that pension reserves  be invested  in "safe"
vehicles  such  as government  securities,  as often  happens  with publicly  managed
funds? If so, this  may lead  to a low  rate  of return  (as  in  Singapore),  a  non-
optimally  low  rate  of  risk-taking,  and  an  overemphasis  on  public  versus  private
goods. Knowing  it has  a captive  audience  of buyers,  government  may spend  more
and  issue  more  bonds  at lower  interest  rates  than  it  would  have  if  it  had  to  deal
in  a  competitive  marketplace,  thereby  offsetting  any  increase  in  personal  saving.
Since  government  bonds  are  used  to  finance  current  government  expenditures,  this
may  also  lead  to  an  underemphasis  on  productive  capital  accumulation;  this  brings
us back  to the  problem  of under-saving  and  under-investment,  discussed  above.
Turning  the  funds  over  to  private  managers  and  giving  them  greater  latitude
in investing  their  assets  may partially  mitigate  this  problem. This  may yield
a higher  expected  rate  of return  but  may also  lead  to overly  risky  investments,
leaving  many old  people  without  the  safe  cushion  of savings  and  annuities  they
thought  they  had.  Government  may then  bail them  out,  as an  implicit  insurer  of
last  resort,  but this  very  possibility  sets  up its  own  moral  hazard  problem  (as
discussed  under  "insurance").  Information  campaigns,  disclosure  requirements  and
regulations  over investment  policies  are  possible  remedies  for  these  pitfalls.
So too  is the  "public  trust  with  private  contracting  out"  arrangement  mentioned
34above, as  a  method for  combining some competition  with  some governrment
accountability  and insurance.
A related  issue  concerns  the  accessibility  of  mandated  savings  and  annuity
funds  for  "social  sector  investment"  purposes  other  than  old  age security. For
example,  can and should  they be withdrawable  to finance  a new home, college
education  for  children,  large  medical  expenses,  living  expenses  and  retraining
costs  during  periods  of  unemployment,  etc.?  Market  failure  arguments  may  justify
such  uses,  but  also  increase  the  amount  of  saving  that  should  be  mandated. These
capital  market  issues  are  obviously  both  complex  and  critical  to an evaluation
of alternative  policy  options,  so they  will be discussed  at some  length  in  the
forthcoming  report.
Labor  Market  Effects
In  mandatory  systems  the  basis  for  contributions  is  often  a  payroll  tax  (or
an income  tax in which  wages play an important  role).  Does this distort  the
labor  supply  decisions  of young  people  and  are these  effects  different  for  men
and  women?  Usually  eligibility  for  pension  benefits  depends  on earnings  rather
than strictly  age; does this  distort  the retirement  decisions  of old people?
Considerable  evidence  from  many  countries  suggests  that  such  plans  have,  indeed,
led to earlier withdrawal  from the labor market than would otherwise  have
occurred,  and this,  in  turn,  has increased  the  cost  of  pension  plans  beyond  the
anticipated  levels.  If the tax is borne  by employers,  how does this affect
aggregate  labor  demand,  labor  demand  tied  to  foreign  investment,  hence  the  inflow
of  capital,  and decisions  to operate  in the formal  versus  the informal  labor
35market? An extensive  empirical  literature  has  developed  around  these  issues  and
will be summarized  in the  report.
In general,  a redistributive  public scheme  would seem to have similar
distortionary  and  evasionary  effects  as  a tax  and  transfer  scheme,  and  the  more
redistributive  the  scheme  the  greater  the  distortionary  effects  on labor  supply
and demand,  implying  a trade-off  between  efficiency  and evuity.  While these
effects  may  be small  initially,  it  appears  that  they  increase  with the  square  of
the magnitude of the tax and transfers,  suggesting  that after a  point a
substantial  deadweight  loss  occurs. This  is one  of the  most important  reasons
for  a  multi-pillar  approach  to providing  old  age  income  security,  with some  of
the  pillars  redistributive  and  others  non-redistributive.
In addition,  if pensions  are  provided  through  place  of employment  (as  in
many voluntary  plans  in the U.S. and U.K. and company-based  plans in the ex-
socialist  economies),  they  may strongly  influence  the  allocation  of labor. For
example,  they may reduce  workers'  mobility  if the pensions  are not  vested or
portable  and  employers'  willingness  to  hire older  workers  if  a defined  benefit
plan is used. These dangers have led to government  regulations  concerning
vesting,  portability  and  age  discrimination  in  some  countries,  as summarized  in
the  report.
Distributional  Effects
As discussed  above,  a  major distinction  is  that  between  policies  designed
to  shift  income  across  the  lifetime  of  a single  individual,  versus  those  designed
36to  redistribute  expected  income  across  individuals  or  cohorts.  Privately-managed
mandatory  savings-annuity  plans (defined  contribution  or provident  funds)  are
examples  of the first,  partially  funued  or PAYG public  systems  are likely  to
contain  elements  of the  second. These  can  use  a  definod  benefit  formula  that  is
flat or only weakly  related  to lifetime  income,  while contributions  are more
positively  related,  hence  the  over-all  effect  is  redistributive.  In general,  a
redistributive  objective  greatly  narrows  the  available  range  of  policy  options;
e.g.,  voluntary  competitive  privately  managed  plans  are  largely  ruled  out.  If
these  are efficient  on other  grounds,  foregoing  them is a real cost of tying
together  the redistributive  and non-redistributive  parts of old age security
arrangement.
This  paper  has  already  discussed  the  efficiency  and equity  arguments  for
using  an old-age-based  mechanism  for  redistributing  income,  and  these  will not
be  repeated  here. It  should  be emphasized,  however,  that  if  old  age  security  is
largely  provided  through  non-redistributive  methods,  other  safety  net  instruments
must be relied  upon to alleviate  long-term  poverty;  the added  burden  on these
instruments  and  the  distortions  they introduce  must then  be taken  into  account
in  the  balance  sheet. Conversely,  if  a  country  already  has  a  wide safety  net  for
all,  it  can  more  easily  rely  on  a  non-redistributive  and  less  distortionary  plan
for  old  age security.
Besides  these  conceptual  issues  are  a  nuv-ber  of important  empirical  issues
regarding  distribution. If there  are redistributions  across  households,  whom
were  they  intended  to  favor  and  whom  do  they  actually  favor? Do they  benefit  the
rich or the poor?  Are they  well thought  out and transparent  or do they seem
37arbitrary,  obscure  and/or  perverse? (For  e'xample,  early  retirement  schemes  for
the  civil  service  seem  to  have  had  the  unintended  effect  of  redistributing  to  the
middle  class,  in  some  Latin  American  countries,  and  problems  concerning  transfers
to  early  retirees  also  plague  some  Eastern  European  countries).  What  evasionary
techniques  have developed  and how have they affected  the operations  of the
broader  economy?  In general,  what changes  should  be considered  regarding  the
contribution  and  benefit  formulae  in the  redistributive  part of the  program  --
for  example,  tying  premiums  to a  broader  income  base,  setting  a  higher  floor  and
a  lower  ceiling  on  benefits,  and  raising  the  retirement  age? Again,  simulations
will be used to throw  some  quantitative  light  on the  effects  of such  reforms.
Informational  and  Regulatorv  Issues
Each of the above categories  has discussed  related informational  and
regulatory  implications,  so they will be only briefly summarized  here.  For
example,  if individuals  are given  choice,  as under  voluntary  savings  plans,
employer-sponsored  pensions  plans or multiple  provident  funds, they require
information  about  the  costs,  benefits  and  investment  policies  of  these  funds,  in
order to exercise  this choice intelligently.  Similarly,  companies  issuing
annuities  require  information  about  prospective  applicants,  in order  to place
them  into  an appropriate  risk  category,  and  if this information  is asymmetric,
adverse  selection  may  result. If  a  plan  is  largely  funded,  its  managers  require
extensive  information  about  investment  opportunities.  Finally,  policymakers  and
citizens  require  information  about  public  redistributive  PAYG  plans,  including
transparent  relations  between  contributions  and  expected  benefits  for  different
groups,  to evaluate  the equity  of the plan.  Since information  is expensive,
38differential  informational  requirements  also  imply  cost  differentials;  and  since
it is  not  always  in the  interest  of  people  possessing  information  to  reveal  it,
this  becomes  an important  regulatory  issue  as  well.
Should  banks  and insurance  companies  handling  voluntary  long-term  savings
and  annuities  be subject  to  regulation  over  their  investment  policies,  to  ensure
that  they  will be around  when the  young  savers  become  old  dissavers? Even  more
so,  should  organizations  handling  mandatory  savings  and  annuities  be  required  to
invest  these  funds  in  specified  ways  in  order  to  avoid  major  losses? Should  full
disclosure  of  their  investment  policies  and  returns  be  required? Should  foreign
investments  and multinational  fund management  be  permitted? should it be
encouraged? Should  employers  be required  to fully  fund  their  pension  plans,  in
order  to avoid  non-viable  promises? Should  these  pensions  be fully  vested  and
portable  in order  to enhance  labor  mobility? Should  the  government  explicitly
insure  privately  managed plans (as  preferable  to the implicit  insurance  that
might  otherwise  exist  on  an  ad  hoc  basis)  and  how  will it  avoid  the  moral  hazard
problems  this implies?  And, if a public  redistributive  scheme  is used,  what
constraints  should  be  placed  upon  its  investments,  disclosures  and  pay-out  rates;
who  will  monitor  the  monitors  to  prevent  them  from  making  implicit  promises  that
government  is  later  unable  to  keep (or  able  to  keep  only  at the  expense  of  other,
more important,  fiscal  needs)?
The  will and capacity  of government  to regulate  investment  policies  and
practices,  when this is contrary  to important  vested interests,  is obviously
crucial  for  the  success  of pension  plans  that  are largely  funded  and  privately
managed,  so  an  important  issue  concerns  the  existence  of  that  will  and  capacity.
39But monitoring financial  viability is also crucial, although perhaps less
obvious,  for  publicly  managed  PAYG  schemes.
Implications  for  Government  Budgetarv  Behavior  and  Fiscal  Stability
This leads,  finally,  to questions  ccocerning  the fiscal  implications  of
alternative  schemes,  which are likely  to vary considerably  according  to the
policy  adopted.  These  effects  are  particularly  difficult  to predict  because
they depend  on future  government  behavior,  about which we do not have good
predictive  tools.  However,  several  possible  scenarios  can  be spelled  out and
will be examined  in the  forthcoming  study.
The  section  on  "Capital  Market  Effects"  pointed  up  that  these  effects  depend
on whether government  adjusts its budgetary behavior to offset changes in
personal  saving. Besides  adjusting  its  total  spending,  government  may  alter  its
mix of expenditures,  e.g.  spending  more on pensions  and less  on other  goods  or
transfers. What predictions  can  be  made about  government's  budgetary  response
to alternative  models  of old  age  security?
Consider  first  a public  PAYG system,  which must cover  all  or most  current
benefits out of current contributions.  If this causes personal saving to
decrease,  government  might  offset  this  by  increasing  its  saving,  e.g.  by  cutting
its  deficit  or running  a  surplus  and  paying  off  its  debt. But  political  economy
reasons  suggest  that the opposite  may happen  in many cases,  especially  in the
long  run.
40In the  initial phase, very few workers are eligible for retirement.
Politicians  with a short-term  time  horizon  can  make generous  promises  of future
benefits,  which gain them  votes,  and  cost  very little  at first.  It  may not  be
in their  vote-maximizing  interest  to raise  taxes  and run  a surplus  to promote
investment  at this point.  If people  are  myopic (one  rationale  for government
intervention  in the  first  place),  they  too  will not  perceive  the  true  long-term
relationship  between  saving,  benefits  and  taxes. Since  older  members  of  society,
who are net recipients,  are more likely  to exercise  political  influence  than
younger  member (some  of  whom are  not yet born or of voting  age),  this further
increases  the  pressure  for  generous  benefits  and  early  retirement  age.
Of course,  with  the  passage  of time  more  people  retire  and  the  system  is  no
longer self-financing;  i.e., current contributions  no longer cover current
benefits,  under  the  old  formula. At that  point,  pressure  may  grow  from  retirees
to  finance  old  age  security  out  of  the  general  public  treasury,  by  increasing  the
deficit. Under  this  scenario,  a  PAYG  system  may  eventually  lead  to less,  rather
than  more, government  saving.
Alternatively,  government  may cover  pension  benefits  by cutting  back on
other  public  expenditures,  some  of  which  may  have  higher  social  value  but  a  less
influential  constituency. Finally,  government  may try  to avoid  both of these
courses (higher  deficits  or reduced  expenditures  on public  goods)  by raising
contributions  or  taxes. But  counteracting  pressures  may  come  from  young  workers,
who prefer  to renege  on the implicit  promises  to retired  workers.  Thus PAYG
systems pose the  competing dangers of  fiscal instability  and unfulfilled
promises, due to political  myopia, interest  groups  who are concerned  about
41private  rather  than  social  well-being,  and  unenforceable  implicit  contracts.
For  example,  in  many  O.E.C.D.  and  Latin  American  countries,  old  age  security
programs  are now costing tax-payers  much more than was  initially  expected,
deficits  have  been incurred  as  a result,  and  increases  in  contribution  rates  or
changes  in  benefit  formulae,  such  as  moving  to  a later  retirement  age  or  a lower
rate  of indexation,  have  been  adopted  or are  being  contemplated.  These  reforms
are  indeed  necessary;  but  the  unsatisfied  expectations  and  changing  rules  of  the
game  are  disruptive  both  to  older  and  younger  generations.  The  study  will spell
out the options  available  to government  by presenting  simulations  of the tax
rate,  or share  of total  government  budget  under  existing  tax  rates,  or deficit
under existing tax and expenditure  patterns, implied  by different benefit
formulae,  as the proportion  of the population  that is old increases,  under
alternative  assumptions  about growth,  rates  of return  and inflation. It will
also  analyze  the  empirical  evidence  about  the  actual  government  response  to  this
situation.
On the  other  hand,  under  publicly  managed  systems  that  are  largely  funded,
a different  kind of problem arises.  Here capital  accumulation  takes place
initially,  but such  funds  are  often,  by law,  required  to invest  exclusively  in
government  securities. Assuming  they constitute  a large  portion  of the total
stock  of savings,  this  will cause the rate of interest  to the government  to
understate the  true opportunity  cost of  capital.  It  is  possible that
policymakers  will respond  to this lower  monetary  cost and  captive  audience  of
bond  buyers  by spending  more  and  saving  less  than  they  would  have  otherwise. If
so,  this  would imply:  1)  more spending  on  non-social-security  public  goods  than
42is economically  desirable  or  would be the  case in a PAYG system  and  2) larger
public  deficits  and  less  saving  available  for  private  good3  than  would  have  been
the case in the absence  of an old age security  system.  The soiution  to this
fiscal  problem  may be to allow  investment  of the  pension  reserves  in private
securities,  on a  competitive  basis;  this  path,  however,  has  not  yet  been  chosen
by practically  any  large  publicly-managed  fund.
Privately-managed  largely  funded  schemes  would  seem  to avoid  both of  these
major fiscal  problems.  However,  they too are not trouble-free,  because  the
government  is  ultimately  the  insurer  of  last  resort. Thus,  if  the  private  funds,
over  which  the  government  has  only  limited  control,  invests  unwisely,  the  public
treasury  may  ultimately  have  to  bail  them  out,  rather  than  allowing  numerous  old
people  to  lose  their  most important  source  of income. (Note  the  similarities  to
the  recent  S &  L disaster  in the  U.S.). In addition,  if these  schemes  are  tax-
advantaged,  as  mandatory  savings  plans  or  job-based  pension  plans  tend  to  be,  and
if  they displace  other  personal  savings  whose  returns  would have  been taxable,
this  creates  a hidden  tax  expenditure  for  the  government.  All of these  factors
might  lead  to  an  unexpectedly  large  fiscal  burden  stemming  from  privately-managed
pension  funds  as well.
The actual  behavior  of government  is exceedingly  difficult  to predict,  it
probably  varies  greatly  from one country  situation  to another,  and this study
will  not  attempt  a  uniform  answer. However,  the  study  will  carefully  examine  the
fiscal  experience  of several  countries  with  different  kinds  of plans  to see  the
range of probable government  behaviors (hence the probable capital market
effects). By  spelling  out  the  different  fiscal  dangers,  the  report  aims  to  help
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their  old  age security  arrangements.
IV.  Plan  of The  Forthcoming  Study
Chapter  1  of  the  report  will  outline  the  wide-ranging  issues  concerning  old
age security  that have just been discussed.  The variety of different  plans
available,  and their  relative  importance,  are surveyed  in Chapter  2.  We see
there that, out of the large  number of possible  models, based on degree  of
voluntarism,  redistributive  versus  non-redistributive  objectives,  public  versus
private  management,  and  PAYG  versus  largely  funded  plans,  three  or four  models
have the most important  real-world  counterparts  and also capture the most
important  policy  choices;  hence  they  will  be discussed  in  detail  in  this study.
These  are:  mandatory  redistributive  plans  that  are  publicly  managed  and  largely
PAYG;  mandatory savings-annuity  plans that are fully funded  and publicly  or
privately managed; and voluntary savings-annuity  plans or  quasi-voluntary
employer-sponsored  plans that are privately  managed and partially or fully
funded.
Chapter  2  also  surveys  the  wide  variation  that  exists  across  countries  with
regard  to  the  design  features  of  their  public  pillars. Subsequent  chapters  ask,
for each pillar:  How does this  plan work?  What are its key design  features?
What are  its  effects  with respect  to the  cross-cutting  themes  discussed  above?
What  problems  have  arise  and  how  have  they  been  resolved  in  countries  where  this
model  has  been used?
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the informal  systems for old age security  that dominate in most developing
countries. Topics  covered  here  include:  the  circumstances  and  groups  for  which
these  systems  work  well  and  the  conditions  under  which  they  do  not  work  well;  the
impact  on informal  systems  of urbanization,  migration,  fertility  changes  and
other  aspects  of  economic  development;  enforcement  mechanisms  in  informal  systems
and  how they  may be changing;  the interaction  between  formal  and  informal
systems;  and  government  programs  that  might  help "fill  in  the  gaps"  in informal
systems.
Chapter 4 analyzes  the redistributive  pillar,  with examples  drawn from
publicly  managed  plans  in  the  O.E.CoD.  countries,  Latin  America,  Eastern  Europe,
and  the  Arab  world.  Important  design  decisions  here include  degree  and  type  of
redistribution  among groups (which  depend  on eligibility  criteria,  basis for
contributions  and benefit  formula),  retirement  age and conditions,  provisions
regarding  indexation,  degree  of funding  versus  PAYG, and investment  policies
regarding  these  funds. Key  problems  are  possible  disincentive  effects  on labor
supply  and savings,  perverse  and/or  non-transparent  redistributions,  funding
problems  due to demographic  change  (increased  proportion  of old  people),  rapid
escalation  of  fiscal burden, and informational  needs of policymakers  and
citizens. Simulations  will be made of contribution  rates,  benefit  rates,  and
their  distribution,  as  well  as  effects  on  government  spending  and  deficits,  under
different  assumptions  regarding  demographic  change,  inflation,  rates  of return
and  funding  mechanisms.  These  problems  lead  to  recommended  reforms  of  the  public
systems, including  the elimination  of inconsistent  rules and unsustainable
promises  and reconsideration  of financing  and  investment  policies.
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Chapter  5  analyzes  the  mandatory  s.vings-annuity  pillar,  plans  that  are (a)
publicly  managed (Singapore,  Malaysia,  Ghana)  or (b) privately  managed in a
competitive  system (Chile).  These are inherently  fully funded, and, under
certain  conditions,  will  increase  long-term  savings,  capital  accumulation  and  the
development  of institutions  that foster  the  mobilization  of this capital  for
productive  investment.  How  has  this  potential  been  realized  in  practice? Major
issues  here concern  the  private  decisions  and  public  regulations  governing  the
investment  of these  large  funds,  the  appropriate  role  of government  guarantees,
and the informational  requirements  in situations  where consumers  have choice.
What has been th- actual experience  and what are the potential problems
concerning  the trade-off  between  rates  of return  and risk?  How do public  and
private  managers  compare  in this  respect? Are administrative  costs  higher  in
competitive  privately managed systems?  What is  the effect of different
contribution  rates  and pension  targets?  Is there  a minimum  wage below  which
contributions  should  not be required? Is a  minimum  pension  guaranteed  by the
government  for  those  with low  lifetime  incomes? What  added  burden  is  placed  on
other  safety  net  instruments  by  a  nor-redistributive  system  of  old  age  security?
Chapter 6 analyzes the voluntary and quasi-voluntary  savings-annuity
pillar,  plans that are encouraged  by government  policy  but privately  managed;
empirical  evidence  will be drawn from the U.S., U.K.,  Switzerland,  and Latin
America.  Often these are job-based  pension schemes that are instituted  by
employers  as  part  of  their  strategies  for  attracting  and  retaining  workers. Key
issues  here  include  the  desirability  of tax  incentives  to  expand  such  plans  and,
as a corollary,  the  hidden  tax-expenditure  they  imply,  their  impact  on savings
and  labor  mobility,  the  need for  regulations  to ensure  vesting  and  portability
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of pensions,  ex ante and ex post distributior.  . effects,  and provisions  for
assuring  their  financial  viability  (including  regulatory  controls  over funding
and  investments  combined  with government  insurance).
Chapter 7  deals with transitions: (1) from the informal systems that
currently  exist  in many countries  for  handling  insurance  and redistributional
functions  to  a  somewhat  greater  (but  still  only  partial)  formal  system,  including
the  effects  on fertility  and  family  and the  problem  of how to introduce  formal
mechanisms  without  crowding  out informal  mechanisms;  (2)  from  pay-as-you-go  to
fully-funded  systems,  including  changes  in  aggregate  savings  and  the  question  of
how  the  public  treasury  should  handle  the  large  remaining  unfunded  liability;  (3)
from  publicly  to  privately  managed  systems,  including  changes  in  administrative
costs; and (4) between more and less redistributive  systems,  including  the
increased  need for other safety net instruments  if less redistribution  is
provided  through  old age security  arrangements. If the crowd-out  effects  are
long  term (as  might  be the  case  if  public  transfers  break  the  "habit"  of  private
transfers  or if the introduction  of formal  systems  accelerates  the  decline  in
fertility and the breakdown of extended family arrangements),  elements of
systemic  choice  may  be  irreversible.  Even  if  not  irreversible,  clearly  there  are
heavy  political  and  economic  costs  in  transitioning  from  one  system  to  another,
which will be documented  here.  This underscore  the importance  of careful
decision-making  at the  start,  to  avoid  mistakes  that  cannot  be corrected  or  that
require  costly  systemic  changes  later  on.
Chapter  8  considers  the  special  situation  in  the  ex-socialist  economies  of
Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  U.S  S.R.,  including  an analysis  of how their  old
47age  security  systems  are  changing  as  part  of their  broader  economic  change,  how
existing  systems  could  be strengthened,  and  how  these  changes  might  impact  their
newly  emerging  capital  and  labor  markets.
The Conclusion  compares  the various  pillars and considers  the combined
effects  of alternative  mixes of these  pillars,  with respect  to the impact  on
efficiency,  equity  and  growth. A set  of  options  concerning  more detailed  design
features  is also  presented.
Each  of  the  separate  old  age  security  models  solves  one  set  of  problems  but
also creates  a new set of problems,  so trade-offs  must be made among  multiple
objectives  and their costs.  Unfunded (or lightly funded)  publicly  managed
bystems  can solve all the inPurance  and redistributional  problems,  but at a
potentially  large  cost in terms  of incentives  for evasion,  distorted  capital
formation  and  allocation,  and  discouraged  labor  supply  and  demand. Since  they
are run  by the government  as monopolist,  there  is no competitive  mechanism  to
encourage  internal  efficiency,  choice  of the "right"  benefit-cost  package,  or
expected-return-maximizing  investments. A major problem concerns  the fiscal
burden of  old  age  security,  which often increases faster than expected,
especially  when the  ratio  of  retirees  to  workers  rises,  as has  occurred  in  many
countries  during  the last  decade  and  will occur  in many  more over  the  next two
decades. If  contribution  rates  rise  in  a  PAYG  system,  workers  may  refuse  to  pay;
if benefits  fall  below  expected  values,  retirees  may have trouble  maintaining
their  standard  of living;  if  neither  occurs,  deficits  increase  and  other  public
goods  suffer. All of these  effects  have  made such systems  non-sustainable  in
many  countries.  Also,  these  systems  raise  questions  concerning  inter-  and  intra-
48generational  equity,  of  perverse  redistributions  that  are  not  transparent,  were
not  openly  discussed,  and  were not  fully  intended  or expected.
In contrast, fully funded mandatory savings-annuity  systems that are
privately  managed  can solve  the  myopia  probleu  and  many of the risk  problems,
while minimizing costs of evasion, distorted incentives  and  fiscal over-
extension.  They  may also aid in capital  formation  and allocate  this capital
efficiently,  hence  encouraging  growth. These  are  their  big  advantages.  However,
they may also lead to capital  market instability  as population  age profiles
change,  hence  the  relative  number  of  young  savers  and  old  dissavers  also  changes.
They  fai:  to  solve  the  redistributional  and  correlated  risk  problems. People  who
earn  low  incomes  while  working  may  be in  even  greater  financial  difficulty  after
they retire.  If inflation  accelerates  rapidly,  private indexing  efforts  may
break  down.  If the  economy  enters  a recession,  rates  of return  on savings  may
fall  drastically  and  people  living  off  their  savings  are  hurt  disproportionately.
If invested  primarily  in government  securities,  this  may encourage  government
borrowing  and  deficits. If  high  risk  private  investments  are  made  and  fail,  many
workers  may lose  their  savings. If government  has insured  the  plans,  this  may
create  moral  hazard  problems  and  impose  a large  fiscal  burden  which the  system
was set  up to avoid. Consumers  may  not  have  enough  information  to  choose  their
investment  and  pension  plans  wisely. Government  regulations  may  ameliorate  these
problems,  but  will not completely  solve  them,  if the  regulations  are  imperfect
or imperfectly  administered  (as  is likely  to  be the  case).
Quasi-voluntary  employer-sponsored  programs  that are largely  funded  have
many of these same advantages  but have additional  disadvantages:  they incur
49hidden  tax costs,  provide  uneven  incomplete  coverage,  sometimes  give  workers
little  choice  or  information  and,  if  vesting  and  portability  are  limited,  distort
labor  mobility  and  allocation. Furthermore,  if the  plan is not funded  and  the
employer  goes bankrupt,  many workers will suddenly  find themselves  without
adequate  pensions. Therefore,  these  may  be  useful  as  a  supplementary  pillar,  but
not as a base  pillar.
At this  point,  the  following  recommendations  seem  relatively  clear-cut  and
non-controversial.  Further  recommendations  will be  made  based  on the  empirical
findings  of the study.
1. The  most  general  recommendation  is  likely  to  be  that  countries  seriously
consider  utilizing a multi-pillar  system  which includes:  a) a broad based
privately-managed  mandatory  savings-annuity  pillar  to alleviate  current-income
poverty  caused  by myopia  and incomplete  insurance  markets,  combined  with b) a
carefully designed public pillar for redistribution  to those in long-term
poverty,  and  possibly  for  insuring  against  correlated  risks,  all  supplemented  by
c) tax-advantaged  privately-managed  pension  programs,  on a voluntary  or quasi-
voluntary  (employer-sponsored)  basis  and  d) a purely  voluntary  savings  pillar,
a continuation  of the informal  system  for providing  old age security.  Some
countries  currently  use  two  or three  of these  pillars,  but  greater  movement  in
this  direction,  particularly  movement  incorporating  larger  elements  of  mandatory
savings-annuity  schemes,  seems  desirable  in  many cases.
The  reasoning  behind  this  recommendation  is  that  old  age  security  programs
have  multiple  objectives.  Since  each  pillar  is  most  appropriate  for  a different
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size),  this  is a rationale  for  using  a mixed  strategy,  which avoids  the  worst
problems  and  retains  the  best  advantages  of  each. In  some  respects  the  different
schemes  are directly  complementary  --  as would  be the  case if the public  PAYG
pillar  discourages  saving  while  the  mandatory  savings-annuity  pillar  offsets  this
negative  effect. Although  the general  direction  of the costs  and benefits  of
each  pillar  are  known,  the specific  magnitudes  often  are  not known  and depend
upon  future  events. This is  an additional  reason  why some countries  use a  mix
of these  policy  options  and, indeed,  a mix is optimal  in order to accomplish
multiple  objectives  with a  minimum  of deadweight  and  uncertainty  loss. This  is
also  why the  "best"  combination  of  policies  varies  among  countries,  depending  on
their objectives,  the trade-offs  among them, and their economic  parameters,
including  their  initial  conditions.
2.  The benefit and contribution  formul-e  of the public redistributive
pillar  should  be simple  and  transparent  and  should  be  based  on  careful  estimates
of financial  viability  under different  assumptions  about ex ante and ex post
income  distribution  and demographic  change.  Old-age-related  redistributions
should be  viewed  as  part  of  a  broader safety net  that  balances  the
redistributional  claims  of diverse  disadvantaged  groups.
3.  The  development  of a  mandatory  savings  pillar  should  be evaluated  as a
possible  means  to  minimize  evasion  and  to facilitate  the  mobilization  of long-
term  private  capital. This  may  also  enable  the  reallocation  of  scarce  government
resources  to important  public  services  (such  as health  and education)  and the
targeting  of  transfers  from  general  revenues  to  low-income  groups,  which  includes
51some (but  not all)  old  people,  some  members  of the  working-age  generation,  and
some children.  The study  will draw on the empirical  evidence  to make more
detailed  recommendations  concerning  the structure  of and regulations  over  the
mandatory  savings-annuity  pillar.
4.  Voluntary  savings  for  old  age  should  be encouraged,  both in rural  and
urban areas.  Governments  can aid this process  by permitting  the holding  of
private  property,  offering  favorable  tax  treatment  to  savings,  maintaining  a  non-
inflationary  environment,  building  the financial  infrastructure  (such  as the
broad  availability of  postal  savings plans, even  in  rural areas), and
implementing  pro-growth  policies;  empirical  work has  shown  that  rapid  growth  is
the  major facilitator  of voluntary  personal  savings.
5.  Early vesting and portability,  transparent  benefit formulae and
financial  viability  through funding  should  be required  of job-based  pension
schemes.
6. Currently  some  countries  (e.g.  in  Africa  and  parts  of  Asia)  rely  heavily
on informal  systems  of old age security.  In transitioning  from informal  to
formal  systems,  these  countries  should  be  aware  of  the  possibilities  that  public
transfers  may crowd  out  private,  and that PAYG  public  systems  may imply  large
future  commitments  that  are  difficult  to  reverse  later  on. Formal  systems  should
be introduced  carefully,  with strategies  designed to avoid these dangers.
Factors  suggesting  the  appropriateness  of  extending  the  formal  systems  are:  rapid
growth  and urbanization,  breakdown  of the extended  family  and other 'nformal
mechanisms  for  exogenous  reasons  (such  as  famine,  wars,  and  internal  migration),
52and  government  and/or  private  sector capacity  to  administer  such programs.
Countries that do not have these conditions should go slow in implementing a
formal system  of old age security.
7.  Currently most countries have some formal programs of old age security,
particularly public PAYC programs in which benefits are not closely linked to
contributions.  Many of these countries (e.g. in Latin America, Eastern Europe
and  some O.E.C.D.  countries)  face problems of  fiscal overextension,  capital
scarcity, labor market  distortions, and perverse redistributions.  For these
countries there is  an urgent need to scale  down the  unrealistic promises of their
public redistributive pillars, by raising retirement age and reducing benefit
levels, to target future transfers  more closely toward low income groups, and to
consider phasing in a mandatory savings-annuity pillar for those  who can afford
it.
8.  There  is no  single  "best" mix  of  these  pillars,  but  a  range  of
alternative acceptable  mixes,  depending on  country  conditions such  as  objectives,
managerial capacity, age profile of population and preexisting systems.
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Benefit-Contribution  Management
Linkage and
Degree of Voluntarism  Public  Private
No Choice  Choice
No Competition  Competition
Tax-advantaged  U.S., U.K. 9 Japan,
Voluntary and Quasi-  Switzerland,
Voluntary (Job-based)  Latin America.
Saving  - Annuity  Plans
Mandatory  Singapore, Malaysia,  Chile.
Savings-Annuity Plans  Ghana.
(Defined  Contribution)
Mandatory  O.E.C.D. countries,
Redistributive Plans  Latin America,
(Defined Benefit)  Arab World.
Purely Voluntary and  All countries to
Informal Arrangements  different degrees.
Note on PAYG vrsus FundinR:
Row 1:  mixed, depending on country regulations.
Row 2:  by definition, fully funded.
Row 3:  usually PAYG or partially funded.
Row 4:  personal savings are fully funded, family transfers are PAYG.
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